herself useful to society and that the society recognize and respond to the individual's own desire for social utilityin particular by providing jobs or some equivalent.
This notion of mutual obligation has always looked good on paper. Many American readers, however, will remain quite unpersuaded by the claim that workfare in the US enhances inclusion for welfare recipients. Rosanvallon does not consider critiques (e.g. Piven and Cloward 1993) arguing that the function of workfare is primarily punitive: an effort to restore labor discipline by showing workers the fate that awaits them should they demand too much of their employers or the state. This argument is reinforced by anecdotes describing how workfare participants in New York have been made to rake leaves, only to watch a supervisor empty the bags and insist that the raking begin again (Finder 1998) . The French RMI program, however, may offer more compelling testimony to the potential for a social policy founded on expectations of mutual obligation.
The book's aspirations are also hindered by an almost total blindness to issues of gender. Rosanvallon overlooks the fact that the problem of welfare, in the US, at least, is largely the problem of single mothers who cannot get paid jobs that allow them to meet their obligations to their children -in a word, to survive. This problem will not be solved by asserting a societal obligation to guarantee the mere availability of jobs, which is what the second half of Rosanvallon's argument reduces to in practical terms. Achieving inclusion for poor single mothers would seem to require a more ramified apparatus that allows them to reconcile work and motherhood (including heavily subsidized and reliable day care). Even that formulation, however, is inadequate when one accepts the argument (e.g. Mink 1998) that motherhood is work and deserves to be supported as such. Here is the real conundrum for those concerned with reconnecting the economic and the social, as Rosanvallon puts it. Finally, there are some patently offensive references to women: on p. 97, for example, we encounter the phrase "sluggish...elderly women," for which there is no elaboration.
Another disappointing aspect of the book is its frequent failure to flesh out arguments with examples. For example, in Chapter 2 ("Remaking a Nation"), Rosanvallon argues that "European societies today are characterized by contradiction. On the one hand, they need to remake the nation, to turn inward to reinforce the bonds of solidarity; on the other hand, they must open themselves outward economically" (p. 38). While the second half of that formulation is fairly clear in its implicit reference to economic globalization, the first half needs elaboration: it is simply not very clear what "turning inward" means. In other instances, the examples provided seem trivial with respect to the point under consideration. To support the claim that "the notion of justice or equity [increasingly] prevails over that of interest" (p. 33) in contemporary conflicts, for example, we are told that French truck drivers in 1992 "protest[ed] the injustice of granting the same number of 'points' on drivers' licenses to professionals driving one hundred thousand kilometers a year and to amateur drivers" (p. 33). (We do not learn whether the protest was successful.) Surprisingly, there is no discussion of how immigrants to France have affected the welfare state and, in particular, the solidarity that Rosanvallon considers necessary to sustain it under conditions of increased awareness concerning risks. The issue is perhaps the object of the vague reference to "turning inward" (p. 38) discussed above; but, again, it is not entirely clear what this phrase means. For the purposes of reinforcing solidarity, are French citizens of foreign origin to be considered outsiders? Even if the proposed solidarity is expansive, such that only non-citizen permanent residents are to be excluded from the French welfare state, the implicit attitude towards immigrants raises more questions than it answers. But that statement perhaps depends on an over-interpretation of a few comments made almost in passing.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the book is its renunciation of a basic competence of social science. Chapter 7, "The Individualization of Society,"argues that it is no longer possible to understand, through traditional social scientific reasoning, collective aspects of social and economic exclusion. "The long-term unemployed or overextended households are not populations in the traditional sense, nor are they part of a sociological group.... Therefore, 'counting' the excluded is no use, for they cannot fit into a category for social action" (p. 98). More generally, "the traditional sociological approach, methodologically linked to intersecting tables of data ... is clearly worn out. ...social historians have also discovered the quantitative approaches to be deadends" (p. 101). Rosanvallon concludes that we can understand the processes of exclusion only as it is experienced by individuals (hence the chapter title), through biography -"restor[ing] to the data their individual values" (p. 102). For a social scientist, this conclusion seems almost irresponsible insofar as it carries the expectation of being taken seriously. There is no difficulty with the claim that the excluded cannot be subsumed under one single type; but Rosanvallon seems not to have considered the possibility that the use of several types can usefully organize our thinking about exclusion. The notion that there are no types at all is puzzling, to say the least. After almost a decade of trying to transit from central planning to markets, analysts are now beginning to examine what went right or wrong, and why. Such studies are particularly interesting when their authors were among those providing guidance in the early days of the reforms. In Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia, Andrei Shleifer, the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal in Economics, joins with Daniel Treisman, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA, to evaluate the success of privatization, macro stabilization, and tax reform in Russia. Shleifer was one of the chief advisors to the Russian privatization chief Anatoly Chubais, and also a consultant in Russia's battle with inflation and macro stabilization. One half of the book is great, but, surprise, surprise, they find that while privatization and macro stabilization were successful, tax reform, which Shleifer did not work on, was not.
The most innovative part of the study is their approach. Rather than concern themselves with "when" the reform went into effect, they devote themselves instead to the more intriguing and challenging question of "how".
Looking back at what happened, they ask "how" it succeeded and, in the case of tax reform, "how" it failed. They focus on what they classify as "stakeholders" and what was done to induce them to support, rather than oppose, desirable reforms. In this way, they propose future strategies for overcoming opposition. By framing the challenge in such a manner, future reformers are more likely to consider how coalitions will be formed which will support rather than oppose the changes they seek. So far so good. Shleifer and Treisman argue from experience that the reforms involve much more than searching for designs; what is also needed, they suggest, is a touch of Albert Hirschman and Niccolo Machiavelli.
It is when they begin to examine their own handiwork, particularly Shleifer's, that the authors lose their credibility. Thus, while they spend considerable time on how to create a coalition of supportive stakeholders that will outmaneuver opposing stakeholders, they barely acknowledge that many, if not all, of the obstructive stakeholders had become stakeholders because of the early but misguided privatization efforts (there is one scant acknowledgment that this might have occurred on p. 17). Concretely, the privatization policies that were so proudly designed were largely responsible for giving birth to the oligarchs, who then did all they could to thwart other efforts to pass effective tax legislation.
Their praise for the privatization program is the most serious shortcoming of their argument. Chubais has acknowledged that he moved rapidly with privatization more for political than economic reasons. He was worried that the communists and their supporters might seek to reinstate a communist system. The best antidote to such an effort was to take the country's businesses and industries out of state control and put ownership into the hands of private individuals. By providing individuals with ownership shares or vouchers (a form of people's capitalism), Chubais argued that he could then create a force that would resist any effort to return to the ways of the past. Shleifer and his fellow advisors designed the voucher system and some of the privatization variants offered to the factory workers and managers.
To be fair, neither Chubais nor Shleifer expected that their policies would lead to so many factory managers becoming owners, or to the birth of the oligarchs. Yegor Gaidar, the chief architect of the overall economic reforms,
